Computer and information networks are a prime example of an environment where negative externalities abound, particularly when it comes to implementing security defenses. A typical example is that of denial-of-service prevention: ingress filtering, where attack traffic gets discarded by routers close to the perpetrators, is in principle an excellent remedy, as it prevents harmful traffic not only from reaching the victims, but also from burdening the network situated between attacker and target. However, with ingress filtering, the entities (at the ingress) that have to invest in additional filtering are not the ones (at the egress) who mostly benefit from the investment, and, may not have any incentive to participate in the scheme. As this example illustrates, it is important to understand the incentives of the different participants to a network, so that we can design schemes or intervention mechanisms to re-align them with a desirable outcome.
individual users) or is better suited to describing institutional users (e.g., corporations, governments, ISPs...).
In the second part of this presentation, I will make the case that to provide improved resilience to attacks, we must be simultaneously mindful of the capabilities of the attackers, as well as their own economic incentives. Indeed, since the early-to mid-2000's, attackers have become mostly profit-driven [9] . By primarily conditioning their actions on their best financial interest, attackers are more and more behaving rationally in the economic sense of the term, and are considerably more predictable than attackers driven by less mundane ideals. Trying to disrupt the economic incentives that drive attackers to commit their forfeits appears to be a defensive strategy worth investigating, as a complement to the technical approaches that have been proposed.
I will contend that modeling attacker behavior is easier than modeling defender behavior. First, attackers show much stronger economic rationality than defenders: the success of the attack directly conditions their profits, while for defenders, security precautions are often viewed as sunk costs. Second, attackers' actions are often publicly observable: attacks such as phishing, malware distribution or search-engine manipulation leave a visible footprint. I will present a couple of recent measurement studies we conducted [2, 8, 10] in an effort to acquire more information on attacker behavior, and will show that a priori disparate attacks all present concentration points. Specifically, very often, the number of actual perpetrators behind entire class of attacks (e.g., search engine manipulation) are small. This in turn helps us inform security games where we want to model attackers as players, rather than exogenous entities.
Finally, I will conclude by presenting a roadmap for future research integrating network measurements and formal, game theoretic, modeling.
